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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF PROCEDURE FROM A
EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW
By H. MUNCH-PETERSEN*
p ROCEDURE is a public institution. Possibly this sounds an
obvious truism-a mere statement of fact,-and perhaps this
is all it is. But at the same time there is a reason to emphasize the
truth of this fact, in the face of the many mistaken beliefs upon
this very point, which have so long prevailed.
In considering legal procedure from the standard of old Ro-
man law-which considered the right to plead (actio) as merely
one section of substantive law--some jurists are misled by the
nature of the dispute in a civil case, and take it for granted that,
as the parties concerned are usually at perfect liberty to settle
this dispute themselves, the same liberty will naturally be accord-
ed them in the resultant lawsuit.
The proof of the fallacy of this supposition is due mainly to
modern German science of procedure and in particular to the
efforts of 0. Biilow, who urges the view that when legal pro-
ceedings are instituted, an entirely new situation arises, quite
independent of the material circumstances forming the basis of
the case. In the subsequent procedure the judge, as the represen-
tative of society, is an essential factor, and thus the case to be
tried at once assumes a public character, however much it may in
fact deal with legally private matters.
From a theoretical point of view this new assumption is of
immense importance. At one stroke it does away entirely with the
notion of a blind transference to legal procedure of the laws of
private agreement which has hitherto prevailed. In numberless
cases which come under the private law the autonomy of the
parties holds good but this right is allowed only out of regard
to general commerce and would not be applicable in legal proce-
dure. Indeed if liberty of settlement were recognized here also,
it might easily upset the whole legal machinery of the state and
thus render her aims and objects quite illusory.
Here we find the practical importance of the modern assump-
tion: that a law case is not merely a private but essentially a
public matter. Hence it follows that its whole structure must
be decided not by the private whims of the parties concerned, but
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by the public itself, in cohiformity with the practical end its serves
and with the social function. it fulfills.
As to the further character of these social purposes there
cannot well be any doubt. It can only be: as easily and surely
as possible to assist members of society to their rights. Every-
thing that serves this purpose must be recognized, and on tie
contrary everything which is opposed to it must be banned. For
instance, if the parties have the liberty voluntarily to postpone
a case, experience shows that this only tends to produce endless
and often needless delay, and consequently this liberty instead of
assisting towards speedy settlement which is the aim of the legal
procedure, acts merely as a drag, and must therefore be curtailed.
Similarly if the liberty of debtors to waive legal proceeding tends
too greatly to prevent citizens from obtaining legal satisfaction in
a court of law this right must be limited as much as is necessary
to circumvent this danger.
In considering the whole question of procedure it must not
be forgotten that its object is not in itself, but that it serves an-
other and higher end-the consummation of perfect justice. The
more we emphasize the contrast between procedure and substan-
tive law, the more important it becomes to remember that there
is however this profound organic connection between them,-
that procedure is and can never be anything more than the ser-
vant of justice, whose value and importance will depend solely
upon how satisfactorily procedure can fulfill her duties in this
humble r6le. When we reflect however that the object of law
itself, as the famous German jurist Rudolf von Jhering once
said, is to safeguard the interests of humanity, this r6le becomes
by no means an insignificant one.
In order that this r6le be properly fulfilled it is not enough
that the rights retained by litigants should not disturb the normal
functions of procedure. It. is also positively necessary that each
individual link in the procedure adopted by the courts be so
arranged that it becomes as perfect an instrument as possible
for the true consummation of justice, individually as well as
socially.
If we would briefly express what, from this point of view,
might be called the epitome of procedure in our time it is, in a
word, simplification. All superfluous technical precepts (and in
truth most of them are superfluous) must be eliminated. The
weak economic position in which most European countries find
themselves after the war necessitates the greatest possible econ-
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omy in every way-and legal procedure must likewise be sub-
jected to the strictest supervision. But the kind of procedural
retrenchment to which I refer would, if carried out, only be for
its own good. Many formalities are truly not merely unnecessary
but are often quite harmful in preparing pitfalls in the way of the
establishment of true justice. Most of the written records which
still encumber many legal cases even though they are called "oral"
might easily be dispensed with. They tend more often to confuse
the issue than to clarify it.
The lamentable result of the many intricate unnecessary pro-
cedural steps, and of the equally superfluous written matter, is
that many cases are prolonged to an unconscionable time. This
alone, if nothing else, should deal a death blow to any attempt
to justify such procedure. It was perhaps an exaggeration when
a wit once remarked that "it was much more important that a trial
be quick than that it be just," but it is certainly true that in many
cases it may be equally important that it be quick as well as just.
If a man goes to law for the recovery of an animal, there
is not much satisfaction in winning the case if the action is settled
only long after the animal is (lead. Or if a man is injured in a
motor accident, his right to damages will be of little more than
theoretical importance if he has to wait years before being awarded
them. In the hustling business life of our times enormous dam-
ages may be done-both to individuals concerned and, econom-
ically to the nation-by sluggish procedure. Litigation may often
mean the tying up of large sums-assets which -the litigating firms
are unable to touch. They do not know whether they are entitled
to them or not, and cannot count on them in their business trans-
actions. The burden of the many economic difficulties with which
business men, or at any rate European business men, have to
struggle after the war cannot but be increased by delays of this
sort.
The artificiality and slowness of legal proceedings, as experi-
ence shows, simply invites misuse. Debtors for example are able
to obtain a moratorium from fulfilling their engagements, which
they do not deserve.
The new Danish procedure is based on these points of view.
In Denmark the whole disposal of a case from its first beginning
to its end generally does not take more than one or two months.
The spoken word is an extremely useful ally in accelerating the
speed of procedure, and, with its twin sister, ininediacy, which
possesses the added advantage that all evidence is given straight to
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the judges who are to decide the case, it serves to convey to the
court a true and unbiased account of the case, and all the details
necessary to give a decision, which even a most studious perusal
of the written evidence would hardly obtain.
There is also a certain social-political element, as it is often
called, about this need to simplify and accelerate legal procedure
in that it is only when these reforms have taken place that the
law will become a fitting instrument to protect the interests
of. our poorer classes. It is especially difficult for the poor to
surmount the artificial barriers fixed by law around all legal
proceedings, and that they are the ones to suffer most in being de-
barred too long from recovery of their rights is only too ob-
vious. Take the case of an artisan who has been robbed of his
tools, and with no prospect of recovering them for a year or
possibly two, is therefore prevented from continuing his work.
Here it is certainly evident that slow justice is equivalent to no
justice at all.
This idea of social justice, first advanced by Anton Menger,
the Austrian, and later so ably carried out by Franz Klein, has
become the keystone of Austrian civil procedure, and this again,
in many respects, has served as the model of the Danish and
Norwegian laws of procedure.
It also exercises some influence upon the judge's position in
civil procedure. In principle, a judge, in conformity with what
in Germany is called Verhandlungsnaxime, which Professor Millar
of the Northwestern University in his highly interesting pamphlet'
translates, the "principle of party-presentation," contrasted with
the principle of "judicial investigation," ought to interfere as little
as possible with the pleading of the case, and should in the main
leave the evidence and its production to the litigants themselves.
Otherwise he might form a biased opinion beforehand, and thus
be unable to make the final decision with the necessary acumen
and impartiality. But this view may easily be carried to excess,
and, as was the case in the written methods of procedure former-
ly in use on the European continent, a judge may remain a mere
passive spectator during a trial without the power to lift a finger
to help towards the elucidation of a case.
This method of procedure does at least presuppose fully ca-
pable litigants, usually assisted by lawyers. If the parties are
unable to afford the expense of such legal assistance themselves,
as much as possible ought to be done to allow them legal aid and
'The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, 1923.
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free costs. In the Danish law every person who does not possess
the means to carry on a lawsuit that is esteemed reasonable can
be dispensed from paying the court fees, and all other necessary
expenses, including the fee to the counsel, will be paid by public
means. But should the amounts thus involved be considered to
overstrain the public purse, it is necessary that the judge be in-
structed to assist and guide the parties in such cases, and this lie
will naturally be in a better position to do, the more simply and
less artificially legal procedure is arranged.
A certain social political tendency is also evident in the rules
applying in Danish procedure, where it is laid down that a lawyer
is prevented from demanding larger fees than can honestly be
considered reasonable remuneration for the legal services lie
renders, and in case where there has been a definite agreement
as to payment, which is obviously unfair to the litigant in question,
the agreement may even be declared null and void.
Another link in this social political tendency are the exemption
statutes, which are continually being amplified-a movement which
seems to be spreading over the whole world. Since the amend-
ment, in the act of 1925, it is now strictly forbidden, by Danish
Law, to take a lien either on the necessary wearing apparel, linen,
bed and bedclothes of a debtor and his family, or even on "other
effects," provided that such effects are necessary to the upkeep
of a simple dwelling for the debtor and his family and are
not valued at more than 150 Danish Kroner (about $40) in the
case of a single person and 500 Kroner where the debtor has
to support a family.
Indigent debtors are thus effectively protected, but there is of
course a reverse side to the medal, in that it is now becoming in-
creasingly difficult for the poor people to obtain any credit.
My remarks up to now have applied mainly to civil procedure.
If we turn to criminal law no one nowadays can be in any doubt
as to its public character and social function. But it seems to
me that we have not always followed the consequences of this
view to their utmost length.
The aim of criminal procedure-and in the light of modern
ideas the aim also of criminal law itself-is to protect society
from crime. But the need for protection is not equally urgent
in the case of all offenders. It is the professional or habitual
criminal who constitutes the real menace to society and whom
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society must therefore combat with the most powerful means at
its disposal. Occasional criminals, on the contrary, do not pre-
sent the same danger, and in their case, society may well be
somewhat more lenient.
If we are briefly to define our modern criminalistic view-
point as contrasted with that formerly held under "classical"
criminal law, we might well say that punishment awarded nowa-
days is a link in conscious and efficient social hygiene, whilst
formerly it was merely an example of abstract justice. Under
what we call "classical" law, punishment was dealt out blindly,
and with neither purpose nor feeling, without regard to the harm
that might be done through the individual to society itself. One
cannot help thinking of a dog biting its own tail, as no heed
was taken as to whether any real protection to society was se-
cured by this means.
But a modern social hygienist-as a criminalist ought to be-
reflect more than once before he use a weapon as doubtful in its
beneficial effects upon society and upon the individual concerned
as he well knows punishment to be. He therefore lays most
weight upon the "prophylactic" method, that is to say he gives
especial attention to everything that will serve to check and de-
stroy the reasons for crime itself. But even when an individual
has passed beyond the criminal boundary, a criminalist of the
modem school will not despair of him. As long as there is hope
he will avoid punishing him and will try by other means to save
him for society. When everything else fails, and only as a last
resort, will punishment be employed, but then it must be so ef-
fective that it affords society secure protection from those indi-
viduals who in spite of all that is done for them will not be as-
sistecd or driven away from their criminal habits.
However, if it may be said that to avoid punishnient as long
as possible is one of the main objects of modern criminalism, it is
obvious that this view also must influence the rules of criminal
procedure. Even in the case of persons who really have com-
mitted a crime we are averse to using punishment. But how
much greater does not our aversion become-how awful is not
the thought-that punishment may be awarded to an innocent
person? The case is not much better when we jail a suspected
person for an indefinite period-or employ other equally evil
legal expedients. Even though the prisoner be liberated finally,
for want of sufficient evidence, in many cases he will suffer the
same injury to his whole social position as if he had really been
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guilty and sentenced. Hence, our criminalistic efforts must be
directed rather towards obtaining the greatest possible security
from sentencing the innocent and from misuse of legal process.
In weighing the pros and cons of public security on the one
hand, and individual liberty of citizenship on the other, it is
obvious that the rules to apply in the various cases will depend
greatly upon whether an accused belongs to one or another of
the above mentioned criminal categories.
If it is not a case of an habitual criminal but possibly of a
person who is accused for the first time, the legal precaution can
hardly be made strong enough. Here in truth the old sentence
holds good: "Rather that ten guilty should go free than one
innocent person should be punished."
The accused should therefore always be assisted by a legal
adviser and if he cannot afford the fees himself, counsel should
be appointed and fully paid for by the Crown-otherwise it is
not to be expected that his services would be very effective. And
this appointment of counsel for the defence by the Crown is
especially necessary immediately a suspect is arrested, since the
very fact that a person is detained will usually prevent him from
securing the services of anyone himself. Nothing would be more
likely to cause bad feeling and to incite class hatred than, in
cases dealing often with matters of vital importance, to differen-
tiate between rich and poor.
Strict regulations should also be enacted with regard to arrest
in the case of persons of hitherto blameless character-and should
arrest have been ordered in the case of an innocent person wrong-
fully accused, he ought, in the most comprehensive way possible,
to receive full and complete compensation and rehabilitation. Fi-
nally, in countries where juries are employed, the accused should
be given full liberty to avail himself of their services and espe-
cially so in cases of a more serious nature.
These views have also been fully realised in the new Danish
Procedure Act of 1916, which came into force in 1919. This act
has been modelled largely upon similar arrangements in foreign
countries especially England-the arrangement of our institution
of counsel still having been borrowed from French law. What
may, however, to a certain degree be described as an original new
departure in our legislation, is the difference in conformity with
the basic criminalistic idea mentioned before, which it makes be-
tween persons previously punished and first offenders. Those
who have been punished for certain criminal offenses will not
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enjoy the same unlimited right to demand the assistance of a le-
gal adviser the moment they are arrested, as may persons who
have a clean criminal record. In the rather many cases where
according to our law the use of a jury or otherwise depends upon
the prisoner's own wishes, they have, when the former offense was
of a serious nature, not the right to demand trial by jury, nor
have they generally the right to claim damages or redress for
wrong arrest. In my opinion the Danish legislative regulations
in this respect almost overshoot the mark, but it seems to me that
they are at least based upon an idea that is just and well founded
-that in dealing with the large army of professional criminals it
is impossible without running too many risks to employ the same
methods as with ordinary citizens. In dealing with these declared
enemies of society it is necessary to a certain degree to employ a
sort of martial law, entailing, as does martial law, a curtailment
of the ordinary rights of citizenship. Only when we thus recog-
nize the possibility of establishing special laws to apply in ex-
ceptional cases can we, without being faced by too many counter
arguments, be able to direct all our efforts to drawing up our
common criminal laws in the way most beneficial to free citizen-
ship.
That legal procedure may properly fulfil its social function
does not, of course depend only upon its outward form, but pos-
sibly even more upon the inner abilities of the persons to whom
the execution of these aims of justice have been entrusted. It
is necessary that these persons be imbued with a sense of the
real and social spirit of present day justice.
And here we at once find that certain provisions must be made
for the education of the future jurists. It might be thought that
in order to conform to the spirit of our times this education ought
to be purely practical, the young jurists being simply attached to
the office of some legal practitioner and there learning under his
supervision the ins and outs of legal procedure.
Something of this sort was once attempted in England and also
here in America, but the results obtained in this way were dis-
appointing, to say the least of it. In the intricate life of a court
or office an inexperienced legal mind can never discover the real
point at issue, and it would be something of a happy accident if the
practitioner with whom the student vas placed had the will or
the ability to teach him what he really needed, for the true peda-
gogic ability, taking things as they are, is an extremely rare qual-
ity. This kind of instruction must therefore be left to those
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who have made a special study of their subject for it will usually
take up so much time, that it will be difficult for a practising
lawyer to carry out these duties as a sort of side line in addition
to his main occupation. Looking at this matter from the other
side, it would certainly be all to the good if teachers of the science
of law would keep in constant touch with practical legal life, and
it is of quite especial importance that their own education before-
hand should not have been entirely and solely theoretical, but that
they should also have had the opportunity of learning at first hand
the practical value of the theory of law as it is actually used in
commercial and social life itself.
Therefore the main object in law studies should not be merely
the practice alone. To learn this thoroughly the majority of
jurists, at the conclusion of their university career, will usually
have more than enough time on their hands, during the many
years they have to spend before they are able to obtain an inde-
pendent position.
The comparatively limited time which young jurists spend
upon their university studies is too valuable for them to waste any
of it on the same practical work that they will usually have to
repeat the rest of their lives. They ought to direct all their ener-
gies towards obtaining as solid a general foundation for their
future work as they possibly can.
This foundation ought to consist mainly of theoretical knowl-
edge, and especially a good basis of social knowledge would be a
decided advantage in arming a young man for his work in the
service of society which so characterises a lawyer's position today.
In my opinion the study of law must be thoroughly based on the
notion of the law as being a side of the social life only.
It is not the actual visible amount of reading, however, which
is so important. It is my impression, on the contrary, that on
the European continent at any rate, we are inclined to exaggerate
our demands in this direction, although it is of course impossible
to exhaust the endless kaleidoscopic phases of legal life. But
what is required above all is that the knowledge acquired be
thoroughly grasped so that it really becomes part and parcel of
oneself. In this respect attention given to the concrete cases in
legal life will be of great use. That this is so, is fully proved by
the records of the famous American law schools, first I think in
Harvard, where by means of the "Langdell" or "case" method
quite exceptionally good results have been obtained, also as re-
gards pure theory. Only along this path will a young jurist ob-
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tain the right schooling, and develop that practical judgment,
which is the chief asset of the servants of Law, for they will as
a result be better able to master also the new intricates of law
which they come across in their subsequent careers.
Though I fully recognise the value of this case method and
therefore have been anxious to introduce it in Denmark, I am still
in doubt whether it ought to be the only one, or there might be
domains of the science of law where more theoretical lectures must
be presumed to give a better result. At least in the Scandinavian
countries we use the case method only as supplementary to our
University lectures.
In order that true human justice may be attainable, it will
however be of importance that other people besidcs jurists should
assist at legal proceedings.
In Denmark trials by purely lay members are hardly known,
and the experience gained in a certain field,-that of disputes
arising from the sale of domestic animals, where lay judges are
employed,-cannot be said to be exactly an encouragement to con-
tinue any further in this direction. Possibly they have obtained
a certain popularity among the peasants themselves (who are as
you know a powerful factor in Denmark), since they feel a sort
of class satisfaction in having their own courts, but regarded from
a higher standpoint of justice the decisions given by these "arbi-
tration courts," as they are called, leave much to be desired.
In Denmark no attempts have otherwise been made to oust
our jurists from their work in administering justice. Their
expert knowledge of the common laws of justice which they rep-
resent is of recognised importance. A court consisting solely of
lay judges would be considered in Denmark a retrograde step in
legal culture, and the possibility of using lay judges to do more
than assist our legal judges is out of the question.
The question of such assistance by lay judges arises primarily
in criminal procedure. Whether the services of lay judges are to
be secured in the same way as in American and British courts,--
refer to juries, who decide independently the question of a prison-
er's guilt,--or as assistant or "associate" judges, (in German
called "Sch6ffen") to settle both the question of guilt and punish-
ment in co6peration with the legal judges-that is on the continent
still the question. But nearly everyone who has had any oppor-
tunity of seeing these popular courts at work-in Denmark we
know them only in the larger cases, as juries,-agrees that they
are certainly of great advantage to legal procedure. As the basic
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reason for this it is in Denmark considered that a jury stands
as the personal representative of common human justice in crimi-
nal procedure and thus forms a counter-balancing influence to a
purely legal view, which declares a certain act illegal and punish-
able without its illegality having any root in the public conscience,
or without the prisoner himself really having been aware of the
fact.
In civil procedure a lay judge's principal importance is con-
sidered that of bringing forward special expert knowledge which
the court is more easily able to understand from him than from
any complicated statement made by expert witnesses. There will
thus also be a better prospect of neutralising a too extensive use
of arbitration courts-which are used rather much in Denmark but
are open to so much criticism from a fundamental point of view.
In Denmark we never have known juries in civil cases and
would, I think, consider them a little superfluous there. But in
maritime and commercial cases we know and use lay experts as
assistant judges, and at the Maritime and Commercial Court in
Copenhagen they have amply proved their worth.
In conformity with this idea, their institution might also be
extended to various cases of technical nature, for in such cases
with the help of expert assistant lay judges the court would be sup-
plied with knowledge which would be of inestimable advantage
in arriving at a just decision in each individual case. This ar-
rangement we also find, for instance in the Norwegian Code of
Procedure of 1915, which has however not yet come into force.
Indeed co6peration of this kind with practical men in every
walk of life would in many ways-as I know myself from my
work as one of the presidents of the Copenhagen Maritime and
Commercial Court-serve greatly to assist in the enrichment and
development of the jurists themselves. It may with certainty
be asserted that what jurists might lose in outward power by
such co6peration with non-legal assistant judges, would be easily
balanced by what they would gain of inner strength, and also
here we thus find a corroboration of the immense importance of a
close connection between the law and the lawyers and the practical
life and its men.
